Exam 4 Review Topics

• Importance of representing the relevant information in problem solving (lecture; Action p. 356-357).
• Representational desiderata (lecture).
• Functional fixedness (Disorders pp. 167-168; Action p. 351).
• Problem solving "set" (Disorders pp. 168+; Action p. 351).
• Means-end analysis (Action p. 354; Disorders pp. 170+).
• Hill climbing heuristic, applied to the detectives and criminals/ hobbits and orcs/ calvins and hobbes/ missionaries and cannibals problem (lecture; Action p. 354-355; Disorders pp. 171+).
• Expertise in problem solving (Action pp 358+; Disorders pp. 172+).
• Problem solving by analogy (Disorders pp. 173-175; Action pp. 360-363).
• Deductive logic: Relative difficulty of modus ponens, modus tollens, affirming the consequent, and denying the antecedent (Disorders pp 176-177; Action p. 339).
• Can people behave as if they know modus tollens without really knowing modus tollens? (Action bottom p. 346. NOTE: There is an error in the book. The argument form should say, "if p then q / not q [the book has not p] / therefore not p").
• Syllogistic reasoning and influence of believability (Disorders pp 177-179; cf. Action pp. 336-337, p. 345, p. 348).
• Mental models: Representing premises versus manipulating/integrating the model (Disorders pp 179-181; Action p. 338, 347-348).
• Confirmation bias and effects it explains (Disorders p. 182-183).
• The Wason card selection task: The basic finding (Disorders p. 183; Action pp. 340-341).
• The Wason card selection task: Explanations (confirmation bias, matching bias, personal experience, pragmatic reasoning schemas; Disorders pp. 183-186).
• Pragamatic reasoning schemata and the influence of perspective or point of view (Action bottom p. 343; cf. Disorders pp. 185-186).
• Availability heuristic in judging probability (Disorders pp. 186-187; Action pp. 384-387)
• Representativeness heuristic in judging probability and explanation of the base rate and conjunction fallacies (Disorders pp. 187-189; Action pp. 381-384)
• Definition of expected value (Action p. 369).
• Risk aversion and paradox for utility theory (Action p. 374).
• Violation of the sure-thing principle (Action pp. 374-375).
• Framing effect (Action pp. 377-378).
• Regret theory and individual differences (Action p. 380).
• Base rates of diseases in medical diagnosis: Does a positive test result imply you have a rare disease? (Action pp. 388-390).
• Strength and weight of evidence in decision making (Action pp. 391-393).
• Phineas Gage and social decision making (Disorders pp. 195-196).
• Frontal lobe damage: Inability to sustain attention; distractability; inability to suppress habitual response (Disorders pp. 200-201).
• Frontal lobe damage: Perseveration and disinhibition (Disorders pp. 201-204).
• Frontal lobe damage and violating hill climbing (Disorders p. 207).
• The multiple errands test (Disorders pp. 208-209).
• The Norman and Shallice model of of the supervisory attentional system and its relation to frontal lobes (Disorders pp. 210-211).
• Correlation or lack of correlation between various tasks that assess frontal lobe damage (Disorders p. 212).
• The CYC project (video).
• Expert versus toddler knowledge - what's easier to program and why? (video)